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11 Abstract
12 There is growing concern amongst observers of the media that news cover-
13 age of politics has moved away from a focus on issues, and instead towards
14 political strategy. Research evidencing such concerns has tended to exam-
15 ine strategic news at a macro level and rarely delves into the complexities
16 surrounding its manifestations. This study addresses this issue by conduct-
17 ing a content analysis of a non-election issue in the British news media
18 (press and TV news) over a three-month period, whereby examining strat-
19 egy news as a frame. The issue chosen for case study was the “euro debate”
20 of MayJune 2003. Findings showed the euro debate to fulfil many typical
21 characteristics of EU reporting in the British media, with coverage cyclical
22 and driven by events, and subsequently lacking sustained engagement with
23 the issues. Although there was a roughly equal balance of issue and strategy
24 framed stories in the press, certain features of coverage gave strategy
25 greater prominence. Despite much of the content analysis’s findings con-
26 firming the worries of media critics, a number of qualifications emerge,
27 such as the active role that politicians play as sources of strategic news.
28 Keywords: Britain, content analysis, EU coverage, media framing, strate-
29 gic news.
30 Introduction
31 Amid the burgeoning research on the news media’s role in democratic
32 life, a growing number of studies have established journalists’ increasing
33 tendency to focus on the game of politics at the expense of substantive
34 issues. Largely referred to as strategic news, this type of reporting draws
35 attention to the motivations of politicians’ actions in the public sphere,
36 and discloses the strategies and tactics employed in battles for political
37 gain. In the strategy structure, a politician’s policy positions are interpre-
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38 ted as a means of attracting a certain segment of voters, or of outflank-
39 ing a political opponent, rather than as a genuine (even if flawed) at-
40 tempt to solve the problems of society (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997,
41 p. 34).
42 Yet despite a proliferation of research examining the presence and
43 effects of strategic news, very few have been conducted in the UK, and
44 most studies opt for sample breadth at the expense of in-depth analysis
45 of the features of strategic news. This leaves a number of unresolved
46 questions regarding strategic news, which are discussed in the following
47 literature review. Drawing upon the findings of a UK press and televi-
48 sion news content analysis of the 2003 “euro debate”, this study aims to
49 fill some of these gaps in knowledge.
50 Political strategy in the news: An overview
51 Amongst content analyses conducted since the early 1990s, the predomi-
52 nance of strategic frames in the narrative of election coverage has been
53 well established (e. g. Esser and D’Angelo 2003; 2006; Jamieson 1992;
54 Just et al. 1999; Patterson 1993), with typically between 5080 % of
55 election stories focussing primarily on political strategy. Even outside
56 election periods, strategic frames have been found to permeate political
57 coverage, (de Vreese et al. 2001; Lawrence 2000; Morris and Clawson
58 2005; Skorkjaer Binderkrantz and Green-Pedersen 2009), though usually
59 to a lesser extent than during elections.
60 By choosing to frame politics in strategic terms, laying bare the ruth-
61 less and power-hungry nature of the political system, the news media
62 have been accused of stirring-up a “spiral of cynicism” amongst the elec-
63 torate, whereby political cynicism, leading eventually to disengagement
64 from politics, is cultivated. A number of empirical investigations have
65 given weight to this claim, finding causal connections between strategic
66 news exposure and political cynicism (e. g. Cappella and Jamieson, 1997;
67 de Vreese, 2004; de Vreese and Elenbaas, 2008; Valentino et al., 2001),
68 though the long-term effects of this news are less clear.
69 It is notable that much (though not all) of the research concerning
70 strategic news is as a news frame. This is probably because the framing
71 paradigm offers a compelling account of journalistic power: the ability
72 of journalists to draw attention and confer legitimacy to one aspect of
73 reality (in our case the motivations and campaigning tactics of politi-
74 cians) while marginalising other aspects (such as the policy positions of
75 politicians, how these might be resolved, and the potential impact of
76 public policy). Entman (2005, p. viii) claims that framing is inescapable,
77 and is at work every time someone crafts a message. Journalists therefore
78 cannot choose not to frame their stories, even though the degree of con-1
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79 sciousness and intention varies (Stromback and Dimitrova, 2006). Fram-
80 ing also offers a theory of frame building and frame setting which can
81 help understand both the content and effects of news media. Over time
82 strategic news has become thought of as a generic news frame. This
83 means that in a number of different contexts and strategic frames have
84 been found to represent a journalistic norm in presenting the day’s events
85 (see de Vreese, 2005a).
86 Where next for strategic news scholarship?
87 The literature discussed so far offers considerable value in demonstrating
88 the rise of strategy frames as a means by which journalists present poli-
89 tics. But this research is not without its shortcomings, and so a number
90 of outstanding questions still remain. These are listed below, and form
91 the hypotheses and research questions underpinning this study.
92 Questions remain as to the features of strategy frames most commonly
93 used. As important as the extent of strategy frames adopted by journal-
94 ists is how they are manifest. If we accept strategy as an overarching
95 metaframe, then it has a number of sub-elements. Cappella and
96 Jamieson (1997, p. 33) conceptualise it as follows:
97 (1) winning and losing as the central concern; (2) the language of
98 wars, games, and competition; (3) a story with performers, critics, and
99 audience (voters); (4) centrality of performance, style, and perception
100 of the candidate; (5) heavy weighting of polls and the candidate’s
101 standing in them.
102 These are the benchmarks from which strategic news has been conceptu-
103 alised and operationalised in this field; though it is notable they have
104 not always translated directly into coding categories. It is important for
105 research to explore which elements of the strategic metaframe are most
106 prevalent, and under which circumstances they are most likely to appear
107 (de Vreese, 2005b). This becomes especially pertinent when we consider
108 the suggestion made by experimental studies that some aspects of the
109 strategic metaframe are more likely to cause political cynicism than
110 others (Valentino et al., 2001). However, it has been quite common for
111 studies (often large-scale and cross-national) to examine the strategy
112 frame as a single entity, thus overlooking the sub-stories. Some recent
113 research has given more attention to strategic subframes (Stromback and
114 Shehata, 2007), finding nearly 50 % of press articles about the 2005 UK
115 General Election focussed on the motivations of politicians (what they
116 call the “political strategy” subframe), and 31 % included an element of
117 the horse race.
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118 Compared to non-election periods, election campaigns offer more op-
119 portunities to report on winning and losing, supported by daily opinion
120 polls. Elections are also punctuated by highly orchestrated media oppor-
121 tunities, as the candidates travel the country speaking to the public. Such
122 events give the news media reason to offer a strategic slant on the style
123 and performance of politicians, and their use of public relations. As the
124 present study is set against the backdrop of a non-election public policy
125 debate, we might expect less strategic news and more issue-based news in
126 general, and less use of the horse race and presentation style as strategic
127 subframes. On the other hand, policy debates can be bitterly contested,
128 dividing political parties and the public. This sort of conflict is often
129 associated with strategic frames (de Vreese, 2005a) as it can provide jour-
130 nalists with opportunities to analyse the disagreements (personal and
131 policy) and subsequent party prospects in strategic terms. As a baseline
132 of understanding how strategy frames work in the UK outside of elec-
133 tions is still yet to be established, the first research question asks:
134 RQ1: Which subframes of the strategic metaframe are most commonly
135 used?
136 Research is unclear on whether strategy frames are more prevalent in the
137 press or on TV news. Many scholars have claimed that the visual nature
138 of television and the practices of news organisations predispose it to
139 a different product from newspapers. In particular, TV news content
140 supposedly emphasises individual attributes such as the personalities of
141 candidates, at the expense of issue coverage (Iyengar, 1991; Semetko and
142 Valkenburg, 2000). Still, when it comes to the strategy frame the evidence
143 for these differences between mediums is not that clear. In the USA, the
144 Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ) (2004) and Druckman (2005)
145 found little substantive differences between mediums. However, Just et
146 al. (1999) found that newspapers still provided more substantive cover-
147 age of presidential campaigns than TV. As there is scant evidence regard-
148 ing this point from the UK, where broadcast and press journalists have
149 more distinct cultures compared to other countries, I have chosen to ask
150 the following research question instead of posing a hypothesis:
151 RQ2: Is strategy news more prevalent in television news or in the press?
152 Relatively little research has examined the differences between media sec-
153 tors and strategy frames. Patterson (1993; 2000) argues that commercial-
154 ism is the driving force behind the strategic framing of politics. If this is
155 true, then we would expect to see less strategic news in public funded
156 television news broadcasts than in commercial ones. However, the evi-
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157 dence to date has not always supported this. When PBS channels were
158 compared to commercial ones in the US, Kerbel et al. (2000) found little
159 substantive difference between the two in their use of strategy frames. In
160 a comparative study of election news in Sweden and Belgium, however,
161 Stromback and van Aelst (2009) found commercial TV channels fo-
162 cussed on the game of politics substantially more than their public ser-
163 vice counterparts. In Britain, all terrestrial television channels have a
164 PSB tradition, meaning the forces of commercialism have traditionally
165 been kept in check, and there is a less clear difference between the agen-
166 das of different broadcast news outlets (see Barnett et al., 2000). For this
167 reason, we would not expect the sorts of differences seen elsewhere:
168 H1: The amount of strategically framed news will not significantly differ
169 between commercial and public funded broadcasters.
170 Previous research has largely overlooked strategy frames in different sec-
171 tors of the press. Although both tabloid and quality newspapers are com-
172 mercially funded, on the whole, quality newspapers are more reliant on
173 advertising income and subscriptions for their income, whereas tabloids
174 rely more on daily newsstand sales, meaning they compete for readers
175 on an everyday basis (Allan, 2004; Stromback and van Aelst, 2009).
176 Tabloids, therefore, feel greater financial imperatives to present news in
177 a format that has significant entertainment and interest value, even at
178 the expense of civic or educational value (Hahn et al. 2002; Kuhn 2003).
179 Strategic frames should therefore appeal more to tabloid journalists, as
180 the uncertainty and suspense associated with the depiction of politicians
181 as strategic players, plus the focus on personality-related stories, is more
182 likely to catch and hold the audience’s attention than the substantive
183 aspects of the election or issue debate.
184 H2: Strategically framed news will be more common in tabloids than in
185 quality newspapers.
186 Little research has considered the role of politicians in the construction of
187 strategy frames. Underlying much literature critical of media coverage
188 of politics is an assumption that political strategy is the fixation of jour-
189 nalists, and that politicians are more interested in issues. Recent evidence
190 from the UK throws this into doubt, however. In his analysis of press
191 releases in the 2005 election, Gaber (2006) reported that the parties had
192 made election strategy and tactics their single biggest issue, with Labour
193 and the Conservatives devoting around 47 % of their announcements to
194 either attacking their opponents, or urging voters to get out and vote
195 (or not vote for their opponents). This suggests that strategy stories are
1
1 174 Dan Jackson
196 not just the invention of journalists, but can actually be driven by the
197 agendas of the parties themselves. Britain has an adversarial political
198 culture, producing regular bouts of political conflict that make their way
199 into the news (see de Vreese, 2005a). Therefore, despite the silence of
200 framing research on who is driving strategic news, we should expect
201 politicians to be active sources, not just passive victims of strategic news:
202 H3: Politicians will be active in the strategic framing of politics.
203 The 2003 Euro debate
204 Given that the focus of most scholarship concerning strategic framing
205 has been in the context of elections, there is a strong case for examining
206 it in a non-election context. The policy debate chosen for this study
207 is that of British membership of the European single currency. More
208 specifically, the content analysis focuses on the “euro debate” of May/
209 June 2003, leading up to Gordon Brown’s announcement of the “five
210 tests” for euro entry. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer gave his
211 announcement of the five tests on the 9th June 2003, when he advised
212 against Britain joining the single currency but left the door open to a
213 potential referendum before the next election. In terms of examining the
214 strategy frame, this case study appeals because it arguably offers the
215 shared narrative of a saga (see Lawrence, 2000), which is the culmination
216 of a policy debate (9th June). According to Lawrence (2000), the journal-
217 ists’ use of strategy and issue frames during policy debates can ebb and
218 flow depending on circumstances. For example, she found a peak in
219 strategy coverage as the “finishing line” of the legislative decision date
220 approached, because speculation over the political winners and losers
221 intensified, and the metaphor of the race became more potent. As the
222 euro debate of 2003 had a decision date, we would expect to see similar
223 patterns in a British policy context:
224 H4: Strategy news will be more prominent towards the culmination of
225 the policy debate (9th June 2003).
226 Selecting a single case study helps achieve the aim of examining the
227 characteristics of strategic news in some depth, but means that longitudi-
228 nal breadth is lost. This is a limitation. Whether the single currency
229 represents a “routine” policy issue or not is also an important consider-
230 ation. Over the years, the relationship between the Britain and the EU
231 has possibly evoked more passion, division and bitterness amongst the
232 British public, politicians and media than any other issue. There have
233 also been clear proprietor agendas in the press that in the past have seen1
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234 reason and impartial reporting evaporate. Content analyses have found
235 coverage of EU affairs in the British media to be amongst the most
236 negative (anti-EU) and conflict-based in the whole of the EU (de Vreese
237 et al., 2006; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2006; Pfetsch, 2004). At the same
238 time, the news media holds a particularly influential role in public
239 knowledge and opinion about European affairs. This is because the Brit-
240 ish public are more like “observers” rather than “participants”; they do
241 not have multiple sources of information on which to base their opin-
242 ions, such as personal experience of public services, the health of the
243 economy and so on (Gavin, 2000).
244 Because of the division and conflict both within and between British
245 political parties regarding the EU, and with the press often adopting a
246 campaigning stance (Firmstone, 2008), we might therefore consider it a
247 special case when analysing journalistic trends. In some ways this may
248 be true, but the consequences of this for the strategy frame are not clear-
249 cut. For example, an abundance of elite conflict can be double edged:
250 on the one hand, it prompts news organisations to give more attention
251 to the issue, which can force them to explain the substance of the issue
252 to their audiences; on the other hand, it also licenses journalists to treat
253 the conflict as a game, emphasising the strategic angles of the conflict as
254 much as the substantive. Furthermore, it can be easy to overplay the
255 distinctiveness of EU politics in the news. For example, the elite conflict
256 associated with Europe (or at least its portrayal), although considerable,
257 is not unique, and issues such as immigration, taxation and war have
258 divided British parties and stirred the press in similar ways.
259 Sample and method
260 The sample period consists of 34 days (11th May to 15th June 2003), in
261 which coverage of the euro was most intense. Only articles where British
262 membership of the euro was the main focus were included1. 786 articles
263 were coded from 18 national daily and Sunday newspapers representing
264 all segments of the market, as well as the left and right of the political
265 spectrum. These titles constitute the vast majority of daily and Sunday
266 national newspaper purchases in the UK. All sections of the newspapers
267 were analysed, except for pull-outs. Television news broadcasts chosen
268 for analysis were the BBC 10 o’clock News, ITN News at Ten, Channel 4
269 News (at 7 pm) and Five News (at 7 pm), which yielded 39 news items
270 (constituting 198.28 minutes of coverage) that were related to the euro
271 debate in Britain.
272 Previous framing research shows many variations in the way that
273 frames are operationalised (see D’Angelo and Kuipers, 2010). For many
274 of these studies, frames are measured for their presence through dichoto-1
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275 mous indicators, coded on a presence-absence basis (e. g. de Vreese,
276 2005a; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Stromback and Shehata, 2007).
277 Typically, between two and four framing measures are used for each
278 indicator2, meaning that a score of 0.5 could be coded for a story that
279 has part of a frame present, but not all of it. This system provides the
280 inspiration for the present study, but was adapted in recognition of its
281 potential flaws. For example, a news story might be wholly focused on
282 political strategy, but the focus is on only one or two elements of it, and
283 so the score for the presence of the strategy frame might be 0.5. This
284 system would be potentially misleading because from the audience’s
285 point of view it does not matter whether two other indicators are not
286 present, if the story is wholly focused on strategy then that is what an
287 audience sees. With this in mind, the present study aimed to develop a
288 system of measuring frames that most accurately reflects the impression
289 of a story that the audience would receive. For the sake of easy compari-
290 son with other studies, a presence-absence (10) scale was still used for
291 subframes, but in addition to this their absolute frequency was recorded.
292 All articles were coded into two meta frames: strategy and issue. The
293 unit of analysis is the news story. Articles were analysed and every sen-
294 tence that applied to one of the frames was added to a tally. At the end
295 of each article, the tallies were added up and the total frame for each
296 article was placed into a 5-point scale, from “very strategy” to “very
297 issue”, with the mid-point being a “mixed” frame, depending on the
298 proportions of each3. The advantage of calculating an overall balance
299 between the frames is that it enables us to address the inevitable varia-
300 tions in story length that occurs, both within and between newspapers
301 and broadcasters.
302 In order to achieve a more textured insight into the way the euro
303 debate was covered (RQ1), within the strategic metaframe, there were
304 three subframes, which were informed by Cappella and Jamieson’s
305 (1997) conceptualisation. The most consistently cited element of strategy
306 reporting is the journalistic interpretation of a politician’s motivation for
307 taking a particular policy stand: This will be referred to as the political
308 strategy frame (see Stromback and van Aelst, 2009). Stories containing
309 this element directly imply that politicians are interested primarily in
310 outflanking their rivals and garnering votes, not sincerely pursuing solu-
311 tions for important social problems (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). As
312 suggested earlier, there is considerable value in examining whose political
313 strategies were being highlighted and under what circumstances. With
314 this in mind, the political strategy frame was therefore examined at four
315 levels, based on observations made at the pilot stage: “Brown/Blair rela-
316 tionship” accounts for references to the relationship between Prime Min-
317 ister and Chancellor as a strategic game or struggle for power; “Intra-1
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318 cabinet politics”, “Intra-party politics” and “Inter-party/camp/lobby
319 politics” include portrayals of politicians as adopting policy positions in
320 order to outflank their cabinet, party or opposition party colleagues.
321 With the exception of the “Brown/Blair relationship”, the categories
322 were designed to be applicable outside of the present case study.
323 The component of horse race frame represents a typical element of
324 strategic reporting (e. g. Farnsworth and Lichter 2007; Patterson, 1993),
325 and is the second subframe. Although the euro debate was not an elec-
326 tion campaign, public opinion towards European integration (including
327 the euro) is regularly polled and so would be available for journalists to
328 use as a news hook for offering attributions about the reasons for politi-
329 cal success or failure. The horse race frame was defined as stories focused
330 on winning and losing in the battle for public opinion. It included refer-
331 ences to polls, but also references to public opinion outside of polls when
332 in the context of winning or losing public support. As Cappella and
333 Jamieson’s (1997) earlier definition suggests, another important part of
334 the strategy meta frame is the emphasis on presentation style and per-
335 formance (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). The third subframe  presen-
336 tation style frame  included the journalist focusing on the style and
337 aesthetics of a speech or statement, rather than its content. This sub-
338 frame also included reporting on the use of public relations and com-
339 munication strategies by politicians in order to look good. As all con-
340 ceivable aspects of the strategic meta frame are unlikely to be covered
341 by the subframes I have developed (see Stromback and van Aelst, 2009),
342 a category of other was applied4.
343 Coding was completed by the author. A graduate student coded a
344 randomly selected subset of news items. This subset constituted 15 % of
345 the total sample (109 press articles and 15 television news stories) and
346 included articles from all 18 newspapers and 4 TV news broadcasts. The
347 graduate student was fully trained and supervised frequently. Questions
348 were resolved during regular meetings during the coding. We reached an
349 average inter-coder reliability of .88 across all categories (including
350 chance agreement), using Cohen’s Kappa5. The level of agreement was
351 considered robust. Detailed information regarding the coding instru-
352 ment, procedures, and instructions can be obtained from the author on
353 request.
354 Findings
355 Figure 1 gives an overall picture of how the frames for each newspaper
356 article and TV report were distributed. It shows that the spread of
357 frames in newspapers is fairly even, with almost as many issue as strategy
358 frames. Even though around 60 % of press stories were clearly framed1
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937
938
939 Figure 1. Overall frames in the press and TV news.
359 in the direction of “very strategy” or “very issue”, there were very few
360 that had no references to both frames. 86 % of newspaper articles had
361 at least one reference to a strategy subframe, and 85 % had at least one
362 issue frame reference. This shows that even the stories that focused most
363 on the issues were still likely to draw upon the strategy frame at some
364 point.
365 There are clear differences between the press and TV news in their
366 framing of the euro debate (RQ2), and an overall frame mean of 2.10
367 (out of 5, with 1  very strategy and 5  very issue) for TV news
368 compared to 2.93 for press confirms this. TV news was far more likely
369 than the press to frame the euro debate in strategy terms, with less than
370 10 % of stories containing more issue references than strategy, and over
371 40 % framed “very strategy”. As with newspapers, very few stories were
372 exclusively one frame (97 % had at least one mention of a strategy sub-
373 frame, and this was 90 % for the issue frame).
374 The element of time helps understand the pattern of coverage, and
375 whether strategy news is more prominent towards the culmination of a
376 policy debate (H4). Figure 2 compares the total number of press articles
377 on the single currency across all newspapers, with the direction in which
378 they were framed. TV news is excluded because coverage was too incon-
379 sistent, though the peaks in coverage and trends in news frames largely
380 mirrored those of the press.
381 Looking firstly at the amount of news on the euro, for both newspa-
382 pers and TV news, there are roughly two waves of coverage: the first
383 appearing through mid-May and the second around the decision an-
384 nouncement of 9th June. Before, after, and between these two periods,
385 the single currency struggled to get into the news. From what we know
386 of EU news in various countries, this cyclical coverage is quite typical
387 (Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005).1
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940
941
942 Figure 2. The visibility and direction of the euro debate in the press over time.
943 Note: On the right-hand Y axis, 1  very strategy, 3  mixed and 5  very issue.
388 What was driving news on the euro? Figure 2 suggests that most of
389 the coverage of the single currency during May 2003 was driven by strat-
390 egy news, such as the government’s tactics in presenting their euro deci-
391 sion and the perceived divisions within the cabinet about the issue. There
392 was a stream of stories about party infighting in May that generated
393 many strategic stories. These included Tony Blair’s announcement that
394 the whole Cabinet would decide whether to hold a referendum on the
395 euro (May 15th), which was interpreted as an attack on his Chancellor,
396 Gordon Brown. Then there was the news (on May 15th) that the euro
397 announcement would be delayed from 7th June until 9th June. Peter
398 Mandelson then announced (May 20th) in a leaked “off the record” dis-
399 cussion with journalists that Blair has been “outmanoeuvred” by a “po-
400 litically obsessed” Brown over the euro, thus intensifying speculation
401 about their relationship. As these stories died down in late May and
402 early June when there was very little news on the single currency. In the
403 press, this period coincides with some big peaks in issue frames, although
404 these took place within a much-reduced quantity of coverage. During
405 this period of relative calm, the press and TV largely lost interest in the
406 story. These findings confirm the view that the EU itself is not seen as
407 inherently newsworthy; rather it becomes newsworthy when associated
408 with political conflict (Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005).
409 During the peak of interest in the EMU story (June 9th), coverage was
410 more likely to be based on issues, but far from convincingly so. Of all
411 (313) “quite issue” or “very issue” framed press articles, 43 % were on
412 the two days after the 9th June announcement. Given that this almost
413 matches the total number of issue-based articles across the rest of the 32
414 day sample, it demonstrates that substantive engagement with the issue1
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944
945 Table 1. Overall frame means in the press by type of newspaper
946789
950 Newspaper Average tone Overall Total number
towards the euro frame mean of articles
9578960
961 Daily Telegraph 0.19 2.78 735
966 The Times 0.10 2.93 13170
971 Independent 0.27 3.30 775
976 Guardian 0.18 3.13 10180
981 Financial Times 0.13 3.20 845
986 All broadsheets 0.05 2.99 52790
991 Daily Mail 0.36 2.97 695
996 Daily Express 0.02 2.92 521000
1001 All mid-markets 0.21 2.92 1305
1006 Daily Mirror 0.36 3.21 6710
1011 The Sun 0.57 2.29 495
1016 All tabloids 0.03 2.68 129
1020123
1024 Total 0.02 2.93 786
1028930
1031 Notes: Sunday newspapers are not displayed in this table but were used in the calcula-
1032 tions of sectors. The overall frame mean was calculated on a 5 point scale, with very
1033 strategy  1 and very issue  5. The average tone for each newspaper was calculated
1034 by subtracting the number of anti-euro articles for each paper from the number of
1035 pro-euro articles and dividing this sum by the total number of articles for each paper.
1036 For all newspapers the average tone therefore ranges from 1 to 1, regardless of
1037 the number of articles.
415 was largely concentrated around this key date, and not in the lead-up to
416 it. In contrast, only 18.7 % of the total (346) “very strategy” or “quite
417 strategy” framed articles were immediately after the decision, suggesting
418 this frame was more consistently spread throughout the sample period.
419 H4 therefore received only mixed support.
420 H2 was concerned with the differences between types of newspapers
421 in their proportions of strategy news. Table 1 shows that tabloids were
422 marginally more slanted towards strategy reporting than broadsheets
423 and mid-markets, appearing to offer some support for H2, but it is worth
424 looking at individual newspapers as well. Within the tabloids, for in-
425 stance, the pro-euro Mirror had far less strategy news than the anti-
426 euro Sun, whose reporting was by far the most strategy framed of all
427 newspapers. With the exception of the Express, there appears to be a
428 trend whereby pro-euro newspapers tended to focus more on the issues
429 than anti-euro ones, independent of sector. This could be coincidence or
430 it could reflect editorial policy: by framing EMU around strategy, the
431 suggestion is that the motives of political actors involved (especially in
432 government) are perhaps cynical and self-serving. This discredits the
433 government’s pro-EMU case. For the pro-euro newspapers, there is per-
434 haps recognition that in order to persuade readers of the benefits of1
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1038
1039 Table 2. How different television sources framed the single currency
1040123
1044 Source Overall source Total number % of total
frame mean of appearances air time
1051234
1055 Newsreader 2.18 38 9.29
1060 Correspondent 3.03 34 34.94
1065 Political editor 1.29 21 25.99
1070 Guest pundit 1.75 4 7.14
1075 Government politician 4.05 21 13.49
1080 Opposition politician 1.71 7 3.04
1085 Private sector source 4.67 3 3.79
1090 Member of public 5.00 2 0.84
1095 Other 3.00 2 2.0
109910012
1103 Total 2.63 132 100.0
110789
1110 Notes: The overall author frame mean was calculated on a 5 point scale, with very
1111 strategy  1 and very issue  5. The percentage of total air time represents the propor-
1112 tion of total coverage (198.39 mins) that each source was given.
435 EMU, they need to be educated on the issue. These newspapers were
436 also probably more open to the government’s framing of the euro ques-
437 tion, which stressed that the decision rests on the merits of the economic
438 case for adopting the euro. Given the balance of evidence, H2 must
439 be rejected.
440 There were few substantive differences between publicly funded and
441 commercial broadcasters in terms of how they framed the EMU issue,
442 with the overall frame means barely deviating from the collective mean
443 of 2.10 reported earlier. Although the BBC devoted the largest number
444 of stories to the euro debate, its substantive coverage does not appear to
445 have been elevated towards a focus on issues. H1 is thereby supported.
446 Table 2 illustrates how different sources in television news affected
447 content. Correspondents and political editors both in terms of their
448 number and length of appearances dominated coverage. Interestingly,
449 government politicians appeared as many times as political editors, but
450 they were given half as much air time6. Opposition politicians received
451 even less visibility in the framing of the issue.
452 There are some stark differences in the direction of each source’s con-
453 tribution to the euro debate, which help uncover how the story was
454 framed overall. Correspondents might give a balanced account of the
455 day’s events, including some background to the issue. Political editors
456 such as Nick Robinson (ITV) and Andrew Marr (BBC) offered the most
457 strategy-based interpretation of the EMU issue, assessing what the day’s
458 news meant for party prospects and the ambitions of the individuals
459 involved. When sources were used, we can see that government politi-
460 cians (usually Gordon Brown) were keen to focus on the policy issues at1
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1113
1114 Table 3. Breakdown of strategy subframes (in %)
1115678
Brown/ Intra- Intra- Inter party/ Horse Presen- Other
Blair cabinet party camp/ race tation
relation- politics politics lobby style
ship politics
1139401
1142 Press stories (N  786)
1143 Mean 2.18 (1.87) 0.66 (0.56) 0.4 (0.34) 0.6 (0.52) 0.57 (0.52) 1.5 (1.33) 0.8 (0.07)
1144 references52
1153 Frame 52 (45) 30 (25) 18 (15.6) 27 (23) 28 (25) 58.5 (52) 4 (4)
1154 evident
1162
1163 TV stories (N  39)
1164 Mean 4.87 1.97 0.92 1.92 1.03 5.31 0.38
1165 references73
1174 Frame 77 56.4 38.5 59 28 87 20
1175 evident
118345
1186 Notes: The “mean references” number was calculated by dividing the sum of each
1187 subframe references and dividing it by the total number of stories. It is not on a scale,
1188 so the higher number means more references. The “frame evident” number represents
1189 the percentage of stories that had at least one reference to the subframe. For the press,
1190 the numbers represent the sample minus letters to the editor, with the full sample
1191 outcomes in parenthesis.
461 stake. This is contrasted with the line taken by the government’s political
462 opponents, whose aim it was to frame the government as confused and
463 divided on the single currency decision. The Shadow Chancellor,
464 Michael Howard’s response to the announcement of the five tests typifies
465 this strategy, which included seizing upon the supposed differences be-
466 tween Prime Minister and Chancellor:
467 There they sit. United in rivalry. Each determined to frustrate the
468 other. Each determined to scheme against the other. Each determined
469 to do the other down … We all know they (the five tests) were written
470 on the back of an envelope, in the back of a taxi, to fix the damage
471 done by the Chancellor’s spin doctor in the back of the Red Lion pub.
472 It was a four-pint briefing, which led to a five-point plan, which has
473 just given us a six-year run-around!
474 H3 is thus partially supported, as only some politicians were active
475 sources in the strategic framing of politics, whereas others emphasised
476 the substantive issues.
477 Having established the presence of the strategy frame as a whole in
478 the news, attention will now turn to the elements of it that were most
479 prominent (RQ1). Table 3 uncovers a number of interesting themes that
480 characterised coverage of the euro debate. Letters to the editor are re-
481 moved from the sample because their typical length was considerably1
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482 shorter than other articles, often only a couple of sentences. Perhaps the
483 most striking is the extraordinary preoccupation in the press and TV
484 with the relationship between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Around
485 half of all press articles and three quarters of TV news stories had at
486 least one reference to the “struggle for power” between the two men at
487 the top of government. This proportion rises to 70 % of “main news”
488 stories in the press (the front three pages), illustrating how this subframe
489 dominated the news agenda.
490 A significant proportion of press and TV coverage of the single cur-
491 rency was also focused on the manoeuvrings within and between the
492 political parties. Policy differences are of course inevitable and desirable,
493 but these reports interpreted the strategic motivations behind positions
494 adopted, often using the language of war, such as in this extract from a
495 Financial Times article: “Mr Blair parried the attack by seeking to high-
496 light perceptions that Mr Duncan Smith has an extremist position on
497 the euro” (Blitz and Crooks, 2003). “Presentation style” was the most
498 consistently used subframe, appearing in over half of all press articles
499 and 87 % of TV news reports. This is perhaps more than we would
500 expect in a non-election context, and demonstrates that commentary on
501 political spin and the aesthetics of political statements are deeply embed-
502 ded in contemporary UK political journalism. Although not an election
503 campaign, around a quarter of all press and TV reports on the euro
504 debate still contained references to the “horserace” of opinion polls.
505 Discussion
506 Carefully building upon previous research conducted in different
507 contexts, this study aimed to understand the prevalence of strategic
508 framing in the UK during a non-election policy debate. The strategy
509 frame was found to be a commonly adopted framework by journalists,
510 appearing in 86 % of newspaper articles and 97 % of TV news stories.
511 Around 44 % of newspaper and 59 % of TV news stories were either
512 “very” or “quite” strategy framed. Although the measurement of the
513 strategy frame used in this study is slightly different to others in this
514 field, the results are comparable. For example, in their study of the
515 health care reform debates of 19934, Cappella and Jamieson (1997)
516 found 67 % of news items primarily in terms of political strategy and
517 25 % issue. In her content analysis of welfare reform in 1996, again in
518 the USA, Lawrence (2000) found 41 % of stories primarily game framed.
519 Strategy, then, was clearly a prevalent narrative presented to news media
520 during the euro debate. But there are a number of further findings that
521 should confirm as well as qualify many media critics’ worries about cur-
522 rent political journalism. They are as follows: Strategy frames work in1
1
1 184 Dan Jackson
523 conjunction with issue-based topics. Very few stories did not have an el-
524 ement of both frames. This should temper some fears that strategy re-
525 porting is displacing issues completely. For journalists, the overlap of
526 frames probably reflects their professional desire to give a complete ac-
527 count of events or issues: by outlining some of the issues at stake, but
528 then also giving an account of the political motivations behind the de-
529 bate, and strategies for success (Esser and D’Angelo, 2006). In the case
530 of the euro debate, they did this to differing degrees. Often, the EMU
531 story got into the news because of the latest development in the saga of
532 the political game (such as developments in the supposed divisions
533 within the government), and then context to the decision was given later
534 in the article, providing the issue frame. TV news was far more strategy-
535 oriented than newspapers (RQ2). Like newspapers, all broadcasters cov-
536 ered the strategic element of party posturing and tactics during the euro
537 debate. However, whereas in the newspapers these strategy stories were
538 to an extent balanced out by some serious analysis of the issue deeper
539 in the paper, this was rarely present in TV, whose reporting was more
540 episodic and events-led. In short, there is little evidence that TV news
541 would engender an understanding of the single currency issue in its view-
542 ers; rather, it was more likely to deepen understanding of the strategic
543 reasons that politicians supported or opposed EMU.
544 There are two reasons why TV news coverage has extra significance
545 for shaping attitudes. The first is reach: 65 % of Britons consider TV as
546 their main source of political information compared to 15 % for newspa-
547 pers (Hargreaves and Thomas, 2002), and a combined audience of 10
548 million viewers watched the main TV news every night in 2003. The
549 second reason is trust: 70 % of the public trust television journalists to
550 tell the truth compared to 10 % for tabloid journalists (ibid.). So the fact
551 that viewers of TV news received a fragmented and strategy-laden ac-
552 count of the euro debate is even more worrying in this respect.
553 As Kerbel et al. (2000) explain, the strategy frame may be particularly
554 appealing for TV journalists during an election campaign because it can
555 be partly driven by an adherence to a norm of objectivity, or “principled
556 detachment”, which is less of an imperative for the press. For TV jour-
557 nalists, objectivity is a thorny matter, and reporters must make decisions
558 about what subjects and perspectives constitute dispassionate coverage.
559 Having mutually accepted standards for what comprises appropriate
560 election news reduces the risk of appearing biased, and therefore cover-
561 ing elections from the strategic perspective serves this end (ibid.). The
562 euro debate arguably creates similar conditions for journalists, because
563 of its divisive history and because it will ultimately be decided in a refer-
564 endum. Just like with elections, therefore, journalists tried to maintain a
565 healthy distance from both the pro and anti-euro sides by highlighting1
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566 their daily conflicts in Westminster, addressing how they were perform-
567 ing in the horse race of opinion polls, and discussing the strategies em-
568 ployed to outmanoeuvre opponents.
569 In this sense, the focus on strategy is probably as well explained by
570 broadcast journalist professional norms as much as an in-built cynical
571 perspective of political affairs. But this is still not without its problems,
572 because if the aim is to increase public understanding of a complicated
573 issue, then simply offering an update in the political game can be
574 counterproductive, because complex debates are simplified into polar-
575 ised positions, potentially creating more heat than light for the public
576 (Bond, 2005). Furthermore, this study found that the way these rows
577 end up being framed by the media is often not as principled stands,
578 but as cynical manoeuvres in order to appeal to a voter segment or
579 outflank opponents.
580 Although individual differences between newspapers and TV channels ex-
581 isted, there were no real differences between newspaper sectors or public/
582 commercial TV channels in terms of the prominence of strategy reporting.
583 Consequently, H1 was supported and H2 was rejected. As few studies of
584 this kind have been conducted in the UK, there is little comparable re-
585 search looking at the strategy frame between different types of broad-
586 casters and newspapers, though TV findings were consistent with Ker-
587 bel’s (2000) study of US election news, and previous UK election content
588 analyses (e. g. Deacon et al., 2005; Norris et al., 1999). Given the similar
589 PSB traditions and regulations that each of the UK terrestrial news
590 broadcasters operate within, it was expected that commercial and pub-
591 licly funded channels would present the issue largely the same. But on
592 the other hand, without the pressure typically felt by commercial chan-
593 nels, the BBC should arguably be able to frame the issue in any manner
594 it chooses. This coverage might include a larger proportion of stories
595 explaining the issues behind the debate, policy positions and conse-
596 quences of EMU. However, in this case, their audiences largely experi-
597 enced the debate the same way as those of their commercial counter-
598 parts.
599 Due to their greater amount of space given to informative analysis
600 and comment and their less commercially oriented agenda, H2 expected
601 quality newspapers to focus more on the issues than strategies surround-
602 ing the euro debate, but this hypothesis was not supported and is actu-
603 ally consistent with recent UK election content analyses (see Deacon
604 et al., 2005). The qualities did have more actual analysis of the issues
605 underpinning EMU than other newspapers, but they also had more
606 analysis of strategy as well. Interestingly, there was more of a relation-
607 ship between a paper’s partisan position on the single currency than their1
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608 sector in their framing of the debate. It is worth noting that anti-euro
609 newspapers, which tended to focus more on strategy, attract a far greater
610 readership than pro-euro titles.
611 Politicians are not necessarily the innocent victims of a strategy-obsessed
612 media (H3). This is an important finding, and underlies the need for the
613 contribution of politicians in news stories to be a consideration in the
614 debate about strategy framing. Findings corroborate those of Gaber
615 (2005), but an interesting theme to emerge was that the agendas of the
616 government and opposition in the euro debate could not be more dif-
617 ferent: whereas the government wanted to present the euro decision as a
618 rational assessment of its economic benefits, the opposition’s contribu-
619 tion to the debate was to frame it as a power struggle between cabinet
620 factions. The lines adopted by the major parties were carefully scripted
621 to suit their strategic agendas. For the Conservatives, there was a delib-
622 erate strategy to focus on government divisions rather than the issues,
623 as they obviously thought there was more political capital to be gained.
624 But this might not be the case with different policy debates during which
625 opposition parties may feel they can cause more damage to the govern-
626 ment by focusing on issues. Further research can shed light on this.
627 At the culmination of the policy debate, strategy news was not substantially
628 more prominent than earlier (H4). This finding somewhat contrasts with
629 previous American literature (Lawrence, 2000). Findings showed that in
630 short, when the policy decision was being debated and decided both
631 behind closed doors and in the public sphere, the news more commonly
632 offered strategic angles. Once the decision had been announced, the news
633 placed greater emphasis on the issues; hence results only partially sup-
634 port H4.
635 If we accept Cook’s assertion that “daily news stories are episodes of
636 larger continuing sagas” (1996, p. 474) then a saga that applied to this
637 case study was that of Britain and the single currency, underpinned by
638 the broader saga of Britain’s ongoing relations with the EU. In order
639 for news to be produced routinely, Cook argues that journalists need to
640 visualise events as part of a larger storyline and must move the plot
641 along from one episode to the next. This applies well to the development
642 of the euro debate, and helps us understand the newsroom decisions
643 that resulted in the coverage found in this study. The substantive issues
644 surrounding the single currency are considerable: for instance, the im-
645 pact of joining (or not) on jobs, prices, trade, business, finance and sov-
646 ereignty. But these issues did not always translate into newsworthy
647 events that might move the passage of the EMU saga from one phase
648 to the next (see Gavin, 2000). There were exceptions, such as when a
649 group of influential businessmen wrote a jointly signed letter in favour1
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650 of euro entry based on its economic benefits (May 12th), or when the
651 head of General Motors announced that euro entry was not vital for his
652 company in terms of investing in a country (May 13th). Both of these
653 news events were newsworthy because they contributed to the saga of
654 the single currency decision and enabled journalists to focus on impor-
655 tant issues that may educate their audience. But they were few and far
656 between, unlike strategy-related events. Cook (1996) sees policy-making
657 as most newsworthy when it is marked by clear conflict that promises
658 resolution: “conflict with movement”. The euro debate offered plenty of
659 this, and a situation of controlled conflict lent itself well to strategy
660 framed news because it provided clear chronological markers of journal-
661 ists’ idealised phase structure. As a result, throughout most of the sample
662 period, when the EMU story was most visible in the news it was usually
663 as a result of a strategy-related event or development.
664 It is arguably very reasonable for journalists to focus more on West-
665 minster affairs when policy is being debated, and that when it has been
666 decided, attention might then turn to its implementation and possible
667 consequences beyond Westminster. But if this is a phase structure typi-
668 cally applied to other policy debates, it could crowd out or delay sub-
669 stantive coverage of those issues, as in the case of the 2003 euro debate.
670 Furthermore, it is perhaps rather worrying that news organisations were
671 most likely to approach the political world with the superficial and cyni-
672 cal strategy schema at precisely the time when public opinion was most
673 likely to be formulated, mobilised, and listened to by politicians. Because
674 this is a case study, the typicality of this phase structure to other UK
675 policy debates cannot be assumed, and so should be an imperative for
676 future research.
677 Prominent subframes (RQ1) were both specific to the policy debate (the
678 Brown/Blair saga) and generic (presentation style). The Brown/Blair
679 story accounted for more media attention than inter-party politics,
680 which traditionally provide the material for strategy frames during elec-
681 tions. The prominent use of the Brown/ Blair subframe is interesting
682 because although it appeared in this case study, it was a pre-existing
683 frame that was applied by journalists in order to interpret the euro de-
684 bate. Media speculation about their relationship had been a common
685 frame since the mid-1990s and continued well beyond 2003, so it is likely
686 that many other policy debates saw heavy use of this frame. From a
687 journalistic perspective, it is perhaps understandable why the frame was
688 appealing during the euro debate, as it represented an ongoing saga in
689 which the negotiations over the single currency provided new twists; in
690 this sense it made the EMU subject more newsworthy as it could be
691 presented in familiar terms.1
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692 Conclusion
693 The implications of this study’s findings can be considered in terms of
694 both the quality of information the British public receives on Europe,
695 and (more tentatively) the normative role of news journalism in promot-
696 ing political engagement. With these in mind, there was arguably no
697 shortage of substantive, issue-based coverage (at least in the press), but
698 it was invariably tainted by the presence of strategic frames, with their
699 undertones of cynicism and manipulation. A number of empirical studies
700 have found that the presence of strategic frames in otherwise issue-based
701 news is enough to induce cynical views of the political process, and erode
702 feelings of political efficacy (e. g. Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; de
703 Vreese, 2004). For this reason, the heavy doses of strategic frames during
704 the euro debate should not be taken lightly, as they can be taken as
705 further evidence that under certain circumstances the news media may
706 be impeding aspects of civic engagement.
707 Examining coverage over time showed that issue-based news found
708 itself relegated to the periphery of the news agenda until the few days
709 around the policy announcement. Combined with the paucity of issue-
710 based coverage in television news, it is hard to see how avid broadsheet
711 readers aside, most British citizens would be able to build an informed
712 opinion on the single currency, and it is easier to see why they feel con-
713 fused about and ignorant of EU affairs. Results also suggested that de-
714 spite their complaints about strategic news, politicians should take their
715 share of blame for the quality of news the British public receive on the
716 EU, as they were responsible for keeping the focus on strategies over
717 issues at times. The findings therefore provide a qualification to some of
718 the orthodox understanding behind strategy news, which sees it as a
719 preoccupation of the media only (see Patterson, 1997). One could ex-
720 plain this finding by the nature of the issue, the EU, which has tradition-
721 ally caused both inter and intra-party division, and so provides an easy
722 basis for stories to be based around conflict. But there are regularly
723 policy debates in and outside the UK where the parties disagree, thus
724 suggesting that trends in coverage found here may appear elsewhere.
725 National context may also explain the role of politicians in strategy
726 news, whereby Britain’s adversarial political system (Cole, 2002) encour-
727 ages the media to seek oppositional remarks from political opponents in
728 order to provide balance to a story (see de Vreese, 2005a). But this sys-
729 tem is not unique to Britain, and is not far removed from the two-party
730 system in the USA. It is also unlikely given the predilection of journalists
731 for conflict reporting in more consensual political systems of northern
732 Europe (de Vreese, 2005a, Peter et al., 2003). It is therefore most likely
733 that the contribution of politicians towards the strategy frame has been1
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734 an overlooked aspect of the theory, and so deserves closer monitoring in
735 further research.
736 But it is also important not to exaggerate this finding. It is true that
737 politicians did add to the flow of strategy stories during euro debate,
738 but on the other hand there were times when they genuinely tried to
739 make constructive contributions. However, the news media  often sup-
740 ported by political opponents it must be said  were all-too-willing to
741 pounce upon such pronouncements as evidence of division or self-inter-
742 ested manoeuvring. The end result was the creation of an environment
743 whereby it was very difficult for politicians of any side to make meaning-
744 ful contributions to the euro debate. The likelihood is that this scenario
745 applies to policy debates beyond that of the single currency, as it is
746 consistent with observations of a “vicious circle” evolving at the heart
747 of contemporary political communication, whereby mutual distrust be-
748 tween the media and politicians leads to a decline in the quality of politi-
749 cal information for the public (Lilleker et al., 2002; Stanyer, 2007),
750 Brants et al. (2010) recently referred to this dysfunctional relationship as
751 “the real spiral of cynicism” in contemporary politics.
752 By examining the political strategy subframe at various levels, there is
753 scope to understand exactly who is being strategically framed. This will
754 differ depending on the context of the study, but it would be interesting
755 to observe the role of opposition parties during policy debates, or oppos-
756 ing candidates/parties during elections, and whether they pursue a delib-
757 erate strategy of framing opponents as cynically motivated schemers.
758 From what we know of strategic framing effects and its effects on politi-
759 cal cynicism, there may be significant advantage to be gained by framing
760 political rivals strategically whilst avoiding this sort of coverage yourself.
761 Indeed, it is possible that media bias towards parties, candidates or po-
762 licies may influence the number of strategic frames attributed to certain
763 politicians. Again, this matters because of the possibility that the public
764 becomes cynical about some politicians and not others, based on the
765 amount of strategic coverage. Many studies examining the news media’s
766 role in elections determine which candidates or parties receive positive
767 and negative coverage (e. g. Deacon et al., 2001; 2005), but future schol-
768 arship might also address who was strategically framed, and by whom.
769 Given some of the unique characteristics surrounding Britain and the
770 EU, we should be cautious about drawing universal conclusions about
771 strategic framing and inter-election policy debates. With this in mind,
772 the findings of this study offer some intriguing and important questions
773 for further research. For example, a content and/or effects study that
774 analysed a number of policy issues that differed in terms of the level of
775 elite conflict, the politicians at the forefront of the debate, the level of
776 public knowledge of the issue, the direction and stability of public opin-1
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777 ion, and electoral time-scale of the issue (i. e. whether there was a clear
778 finishing line for legislation, or whether it was conducted near the start
779 or end of an electoral cycle), would deepen our understanding of under
780 what circumstances strategy narratives enter the news and how contex-
781 tual variables moderate their effects on audiences.
782 Bionote
783 Dan Jackson is Senior Lecturer at The Media School, Bournemouth Uni-
784 versity, UK.
785 Notes
786 1. In order to qualify for analysis, articles and TV news stories must mention a key-
787 word in two independent sentences. Keywords used were “euro”, “single currency”,
788 “EMU”, “European Monetary Union”, “five tests” and “5 tests”. This is consistent
789 with similar studies where the focus is on coverage of EU issues (e. g. de Vreese,
790 2005a), and ensures that the most relevant stories were selected.
791 2. For example, de Vreese (2005a) measured the economic consequences frame
792 through three measures: “Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense in-
793 volved?”, Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursu-
794 ing the action?”, and “Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the
795 future?”. All were answered with a Yes (1) or No (0) to make the overall frame
796 score out of 3, which was then recoded into a 01 scale.
797 3. The formula used for calculating the overall frame is as follows: Every sentence in
798 a story that includes a strategy or issue subframe is coded as one reference. If there
799 are three times more strategy than issue references in a news story (e. g. 15 strategy
800 and 4 issue), then the overall frame is classified as “very strategy” (and vice versa
801 if there are three times more issue references). If there are 50 % more strategy than
802 issue references in a news story (e. g. 15 strategy and 9 issue), then the overall frame
803 is “quite strategy” (and vice versa if there are 50 % more issue references). If there
804 is less than 50 % more references to subframe than the other (e. g. 15 strategy and
805 11 issue) then the overall frame is “mixed”.
806 4. Despite it being part of Cappella and Jamieson’s (1997) conceptualisation of strate-
807 gic news, a distinct subframe for the language of war, games and competition was
808 not included. This is not to say that journalists did not use such language, but
809 rather that it was invariably applied in the context of the other subframes, such as
810 the Brown/Blair relationship and inter-party politics (as part of the political strat-
811 egy frame). Therefore, in order to retain the distinctiveness of the coding categories,
812 sports and war metaphors were not explicitly coded.
813 5. The intercoder agreements on each of the strategic subframes were as follows:
814 Brown/Blair relationship, press k  .90, TV news k .94; intra-cabinet politics, press
815 k  .76, TV news k .79; intra-party politics, press k  .86, TV news k  .88; inter-
816 party/camp/lobby politics, press k  .89, TV news  .86; horse race subframe,
817 press k  .94, TV news k  .97; presentation style subframe, press k  .82, TV
818 news k  .75; overall meta frame (e. g. very strategy), press k  .85, TV news  .82.
819 6. 6 Political editors spoke for an average of 2.10 minutes per story to the government
820 politicians’ 1.03 minutes.
8211
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